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6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Levi Neuwirth ef7d263fed Amend Wave B storage contracts after adversarial review
The B2 review of the first B1/B3 slice found five defects whose fixes were
not available to the packages that had to make them: each needed a change
to a surface those packages do not own. Rather than let them restate a
frozen fact locally, the lead amends the surfaces and the packages consume
them. Contract review 2026-07-28-A records all five with the weaker
alternative that was rejected for each.

  - CommitEvidenceSigner::sign_event's parameter becomes signing_digest.
    The message is SignedCommittedTransactionV1::signing_digest, which
    binds key epoch and durability result around the canonical event; the
    bare event digest is chain identity, not signature material. A doc line
    was not enough: misuse is undetectable until after durability, and is
    first observed by a mirror on another instance.

  - TransactionEvidenceV1::actor() is new, exhaustive over all six
    variants. A destination event's actor must restate the evidence's
    source instance, and deriving it a second way store-side is what
    produced the defect it closes.

  - format::object_type_code becomes pub(crate) and recovery.rs's private
    twin is deleted, so one table exists where three did.

  - RefRecord gains from_target/target() in terms of RefTarget, with the
    code table stated once per direction and an unknown kind refused by
    value as CheckpointError::RefKind. Defaulting an unknown kind would
    launder it into the next checkpoint within one interval.

  - max_projection_objects is capped at MAX_CANONICAL_ITEMS and its default
    lowered to it; max_projection_chunks likewise, and max_projection_bytes
    against the transitive per-chunk allowance. The old default described a
    projection no manifest could encode. Supporting a hundred million
    objects requires a versioned chunked or indexed manifest design, not a
    larger hostile-decode ceiling.

Both governing documents are updated where they now misstate a frozen
fact, including §6.4's claim that signing covers the event digest. §6.5
records the two carry-forwards from B3's first slice — production staging
use is incomplete, and expire() has no scheduler — and records that the
requested StoreEngine staging accessor is a pending amendment which must
not be a bare Arc<ProjectionStaging>, since a clone could outlive
EngineShared, survive release of the root LOCK, and keep serving a root
this process no longer holds.

No package file is touched: engine.rs, transaction.rs, and staging.rs
consume these in their own commits.

levcs-protocol 6 consumer tests, levcs-store 109 library tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-28 18:01:05 -04:00
Levi Neuwirth e85a159525 Scope Wave B storage work 2026-07-27 21:31:52 -04:00
Levi Neuwirth 5ee9c6b78b Freeze Wave A: Phase 1 storage spine
Freezes the Wave A interfaces, frame format, durability ordering, and
crash/fault fixtures per doc/phase1-storage-spine-scope.md section 5. Wave B
may now start against these.

D0 lands crates/levcs-store: the sealed public API, the file-ownership split,
the single durability syscall funnel with its counters and fault hooks, the
17-entry failpoint registry in compiler-enforced correspondence with
oracle::AppendFailpoint, and the journal-level drive seam. Wave A lands the
frame codec and journal/segment lifecycle (A1), the recovery index and
checkpoints (A2), and the durable-ingest benchmark and crash harness (A3).

The adversarial review found five defects behind a green gate, three of them
blockers, all closed here. Two were the same shape: drive::reopen_through_
recovery had reimplemented a simplified recovery and called none of recovery.rs
-- so it adopted segment footer sequences without validating frame bytes,
journal_id, or root_uuid, and it double-adopted interrupted seals. The seam
between two packages was untested precisely because each package's own tests
passed. reopen_through_recovery now delegates rather than decides, and
DriveRecovery carries the recovery report verbatim so tests assert the
disposition and not merely its effect: a double adoption and a correct replay
produce the same adopted set, which is how the defect stayed invisible.

Also closed: store-bench now schema-validates its own emitted artifact with a
five-mutation negative control instead of matching JSON substrings; the ACK
reconciler distinguishes duplicates and regressions from forward gaps;
checkpoint writes and a journal truncation are routed through the durability
funnel, whose guard now covers writes and truncations rather than only sync,
rename, and unlink.

bench/result-schema.json is amended (contract review 2026-07-24-B, second and
third amendments): per-gate latency ceilings conditional on outcome so a failed
run is representable, and the verification claims split per gate so a storage
run cannot certify an object graph it never touches. Not-applicable claims are
forbidden rather than falsified; applicable-but-not-performed report false.
Every relaxation is re-pinned in the else branch and asserted member by member,
after an edit in this series silently un-pinned all eleven validation flags and
was caught only by revalidating against constructed bundles.

Arming the fault registry now requires a FaultSerial token, so the invariant is
a compile error rather than a comment. The file where this was diagnosed
carried a header saying it was deliberately the only test in it, and a second
test had been added under that comment anyway -- an 8-in-40 failure rate that
read as flakiness.

Evidence at this commit: check-phase1.sh GATE_EXIT=0 across all four feature
configurations, 124 test binaries, zero failures; verify-store-recovery.sh
--cycles 100 with recovery_failures=0, acknowledged_loss=0,
torn_transactions=0, repeated_adoptions=0, bundle=schema-valid; recovery_eio
40/40 at four test threads; golden corpus byte-stable; fmt clean.

Carry-forwards, explicitly not Wave A blockers and recorded in scope section 5:
extend the crash matrix to generate sealed-frame corruption and cross-shard
journal movement, since it structurally cannot express the class the first
blocker belonged to; and wire GroupBuilder through B1's production path, since
deliverable 4-A1.2 is presently asserted only over a type nothing calls.

Charter item 9 -- ask every package what of its work is correct but uncalled --
is accepted for every subsequent wave. It, not the review, found the class.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01QNy4Ve7mogg4X1ezJTnFxG
2026-07-26 19:47:03 -04:00
Levi Neuwirth d22f48ae08 Robustness fixes 2026-05-03 20:56:46 -04:00
Levi Neuwirth 1996db37b2 integrate CI and docs 2026-05-01 11:29:18 -04:00
Levi Neuwirth 21c6056ae6 levcs 0.1.0 - initial core 2026-05-01 11:14:36 -04:00