auto: 2026-08-29T19:06:07Z [skip ci]
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@ -151,14 +151,15 @@ against 0.655 for the Charlson index. The calculator is deployed.
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## The question
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::: {.work-thesis}
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How do you establish trustworthy claims about an AI system when the system, the
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operator, and the evaluator may each be untrusted?
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Those four are one problem approached from different sides. Cryptography works
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from below, certifying properties of a computation without trusting the party
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that ran it. Evaluations work from above, measuring what a model actually does
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under conditions you control. Formal methods supply the machinery for checking a
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claim without trusting its author.
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Cryptography attacks this from below, certifying properties of a computation
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without trusting the party who ran it. Evaluations attack it from above,
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measuring what a model actually does under conditions you control. Formal
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methods supply the machinery for checking a claim without trusting its author.
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The four projects above are attempts on different faces of the same problem.
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The question underneath all of it: how do you establish trustworthy claims about
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an AI system when the system, the operator, and the evaluator may each be
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untrusted?
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:::
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## More work
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